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ABSTRACT  
The COVID-19 pandemic represents a massive global health crisis. Because the crisis 
requires large-scale behaviour change and places significant psychological burdens on 
individuals, insights from the social and behavioural sciences can be used to help align 
human behavior with the recommendations of epidemiologists and public health 
experts. Here we discuss evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to 
pandemics, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on 
behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and 
coping. In each section, we note the nature and quality of prior research, including 
uncertainty and unsettled issues. We identify several insights for effective response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, and also highlight important gaps researchers should move 
quickly to fill in the coming weeks and months. 
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Introduction (6642 words) 
In December 2019, a new coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) emerged, sparking an 
epidemic of acute respiratory syndrome (COVID-19) in humans, centered in Wuhan, 
China (see 1). Within three months, the virus had spread to more than 118,000 cases 
and caused 4,291 deaths in 114 countries, leading the World Health Organization to 
declare a global pandemic. The pandemic has led to a massive global public health 
campaign to slow the spread of the virus by increasing hand washing, reducing face 
touching, wearing masks in public, and physical distancing. 
While efforts to develop pharmaceutical interventions for COVID-19 are under 
way, the social and behavioural sciences can provide valuable insights for managing 
the pandemic and its impacts. Existing research can be leveraged to formulate effective 
public health messages, identify cultural and structural factors related to disease 
spread, sustain prosocial motivations in large societies, manage anxiety and loneliness, 
and motivate compassion for at-risk populations. We discuss topics that are broadly 
relevant to numerous stages of the current pandemic to help policy-makers, leaders, 
and the public better understand how to manage risk, reduce social conflict, improve 
communication, enhance cooperation, model effective leadership, and provide social 
and emotional support. For each area, we highlight relevant insights, discuss 
implications for policy makers, leaders, and the public (see Box 1), and highlight areas 
for future research. 
Due to space constraints, this paper provides a brief summary of each topic. 
Research topics discussed here were identified by the corresponding authors as 
potentially relevant to pandemic response, and thus are not exhaustive (for a review of 
research on specific actions, such as handwashing, face-touching, and self-isolation, 
see 2). Furthermore, research on these topics is ongoing and, in many cases, far from 
settled. We have highlighted relevant findings in each area as well as critical gaps in the 
literature. Insights and implications for policy should be interpreted with caution because 
there is very little published social science research on the current pandemic. Thus, our 
discussion often draws from different circumstances than the current pandemic (e.g., 
laboratory experiments examining hypothetical scenarios), and quality of evidence cited 
varies substantially (e.g., correlational studies versus field experiments, single studies 
versus systematic reviews of substantial evidence). In the sections that follow, we try to 
describe the quality of evidence to facilitate careful, critical engagement by readers.  We 
call for the scientific community to mobilize rapidly to produce research to directly inform 
policy and individual/collective behaviour in response to the pandemic. 
 
Threat Perception 
Historically, infectious diseases have been responsible for the greatest human 
death tolls. For example, the bubonic plague killed approximately 25% of the European 
population3. In this section, we discuss how people are likely to perceive and respond to 
threats and risk during a pandemic, and downstream consequences for decision-making 
and intergroup relations. 
Threat  
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One of the central emotional responses during a pandemic is fear. Humans, like 
other animals, possess a set of defensive systems for combating ecological threats4,5. 
Negative emotions resulting from threat can be contagious6, and fear can make threats 
appear more imminent7. One meta-analysis found that targeting fears can be useful in 
some situations, but not others: Appealing to fear leads people to change their behavior 
if they feel capable of dealing with the threat, but leads to defensive reactions when they 
feel helpless to act8. The results suggest that strong fear appeals produce the greatest 
behavior change only when people feel a sense of efficacy, whereas strong fear 
appeals with low-efficacy messages produce the greatest levels of defensive 
responses. 
Another challenge is that people often exhibit an “optimism bias”: the belief that 
bad things are less likely to befall oneself than others. While optimism bias may be 
useful for avoiding negative emotions9, it can lead people to underestimate their 
likelihood of contracting a disease10, and  therefore ignore public health warnings11. 
Communication strategies must strike a balance between breaking through optimism 
bias without inducing excessive feelings of anxiety and dread. 
Emotion and Risk Perception 
Sound health decisions depend on accurate perceptions of the costs and benefits of 
certain choices for oneself, and for society12,13. Emotions often drive risk perceptions, 
sometimes more so than factual information14,15. An emotional response to a risky 
situation can influence thinking in two-stages16. First, the emotion’s quality (e.g., positive 
vs. negative) focuses people on congruent information (e.g., negative information when 
feeling negative). That information, rather than the feeling itself, is then used to guide 
judgment at the second stage. For example, smokers exposed to more negative 
emotional health warnings experienced more negative emotion to warnings and 
smoking, spent more time examining warnings, and recalled more risks, with 
subsequent effects on risk perception and quitting intentions17,18. As negative emotions 
increase, people may rely on negative information about COVID-19 more than other 
information to make decisions. 
In the case of strong emotional reactions, people may also ignore important 
numeric information such as probabilities19 and a problem’s scope20. Negative framing 
captures attention, especially for people who are less mathematically skilled21. The 
media usually report on COVID-19 negatively – for example, by reporting the number of 
people infected and those who die – as opposed to those who recover or experience 
only mild symptoms. This may increase negative emotion and sensitize people to 
otherwise neglected risks for themselves or others. Research is needed to determine 
whether a more positive frame could educate the public and relieve negative emotions 
while increasing public health behaviors. 
Prejudice and discrimination 
The experience of fear and threat has ramifications not only for how people think 
about themselves, but also how they feel about and react to others--in particular, out-
groups. For instance, being threatened with disease is often associated with higher 
levels of ethnocentrism22; greater fear and perceived threat are associated with greater 
intolerance and punitiveness toward out-groups23–25. Highlighting group boundaries can 
undermine empathy with those who are socially distant26,27 and increase 
dehumanization28 or punishment29.  
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The bubonic plague, for example, unleashed massive violence in Europe, 
including the murder of Catalans in Sicily, clerics and beggars in some locations, and 
pogroms against Jews, with over a thousand communities eradicated30. Although not 
every pandemic leads to violence, disease threat can nonetheless give rise to 
discrimination and violence against stigmatized or scapegoated groups. Already, there 
have been reports of physical attacks on ethnic Asian people in predominantly White 
countries, and some government officials’ mis-characterizations of SARS-CoV-2 as the 
“Wuhan” or “Chinese virus”31.  
Conversely, a global pandemic may also create opportunities to reduce religious 
and ethnic prejudice. Coordinated efforts across individuals, communities, and 
governments to fight the spread of disease can send strong signals of cooperation and 
shared values, which could facilitate reorganization of previously considered out-groups 
and in-groups into a single community with a common destiny. This “superordinate 
categorization” is most effective when everyone is of equal status32. These cooperative 
acts are already unfolding in the current pandemic. For example, 21 countries donated 
medical supplies to China in February, and China has reciprocated widely. Highlighting 
events like these could improve out-group attitudes33 and foster further international 
cooperation. 
Disaster and “panic” 
There is a common belief in popular culture that, when in peril, people panic - 
especially when in crowds. That is, they act blindly and excessively out of self-
preservation, potentially endangering the survival of all34. This idea has been used to 
explain responses to the current COVID-19 outbreak – most commonly in relation to the 
notion of “panic buying.” However, close inspection of what happens in disasters 
reveals a different picture. Certainly, some people do act selfishly and some, especially 
those who are particularly vulnerable, may experience more distress. But cooperation 
and orderly, norm-governed behaviour are common across a range of emergencies and 
disasters; and there are many instances when people display remarkable altruism35. 
There is already evidence that mutual aid groups among the public have become 
widespread in response to Covid-1936. Indeed, in fires37 and other natural disasters38 
people are less likely to die from over-reaction than from under-reaction, that is, not 
responding to signs of danger until it is too late.  
In fact, the concept of “panic” has largely been abandoned by researchers 
because it neither describes nor explains what people usually do in disaster39. Instead, 
the focus has shifted to the factors that explain why people cooperate rather than 
compete in response to a crisis35. One of these factors is an emerging sense of shared 
identity, and concern for others, which arises from the shared experience of being in a 
disaster40. This feeling can be harnessed by addressing the public in collective terms 
and by urging “us” to act for the common good41. 
Conversely, the sense of shared identity can be undermined by representing 
others as competitors. This can happen with images of empty shelves and stories of 
“panic buying,” which suggest that others are only looking out for themselves, thus 
prompting a desire for doing the same. Stocking up on supplies is adaptive in 
preparation for potential self-isolation42. However, use of the notion of “panic” can be 
actively harmful. News stories that employ the language of “panic” often create the very 
phenomena that they purport to condemn. They can foster the very individualism and 
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competitiveness that turns sensible preparations into dysfunctional stockpiling and 
undermine the sense of collective purpose which facilitates people supporting one 
another during an emergency.  
 
Social Context 
Slowing viral transmission during pandemics requires significant shifts in 
behavior. Various aspects of social and cultural contexts influence the extent and speed 
of behaviour change. In this section, we describe how aspects of the social context, 
such as social norms, social inequality, culture, and polarization, may help decision-
makers identify risk factors and effectively intervene. 
Social Norms 
People’s behaviors are influenced by social norms: what they perceive others are 
doing and approve or disapprove of43. A large literature has distinguished different 
motives for conformity to norms, including the desire to learn from other people and to 
gain affiliation or social approval43,44. Although people are influenced by norms, their 
perceptions are often inaccurate45. For example, people can underestimate health-
promoting behaviors (e.g., hand washing46) and overestimate unhealthy behaviors47.  
Changing behaviors by correcting misperceptions can be achieved by public 
messages reinforcing positive (e.g., health promoting) norms. Providing purely 
descriptive normative information can backfire by reducing positive behaviors among 
people who already engage in them, unless it is accompanied by information about 
social approval for these actions48,49. Perceived norms are also most influential when 
specific to others with whom common identities are shared50, including for the spread of 
health behaviors51. Therefore, messages that provide ingroup models for norms (e.g., 
members of your community) may therefore be most effective. 
Social networks can amplify the spread of behaviors that are both harmful and 
beneficial during an epidemic, and these effects may spread through the network to 
friends, friends’ friends, and even friends’ friends’ friends52. The virus itself spreads from 
person to person, and since people centrally located in networks come into contact with 
more people, they are often among the first to be infected53. But these very same 
central people may be instrumental in slowing the disease because they can spread 
positive interventions like hand washing and physical distancing by demonstrating them 
to a wide range of people54. Some research suggests that a larger proportion of 
interventions can come not from direct effects on people who receive the intervention, 
but from indirect effects on their social contacts who copied the behavior55. We may 
therefore leverage the impact of any behavior change effort by targeting well-connected 
individuals and making their behavior change visible and salient to others. 
9 
 
Another way to leverage the impact of norms falls under the general category of 
“nudges”56,57, which influence behaviour subtly through modification of choice 
architecture (i.e., the contexts in which people make decisions). Because people are 
highly reactive to the choices made by others, especially trusted others, an 
understanding of social norms that are seen as new or emerging can have a positive 
impact on behavior58. For instance, a message with compelling social norms might say: 
“The overwhelming majority of people in your community believe that everyone should 
stay home”. Nudges and normative information can be an alternative to more coercive 
means of behavior change or used to complement regulatory, legal, and other imposed 
policies when widespread changes must occur rapidly. 
Social Inequality 
Inequalities in access to resources affect not only who is at greatest risk of 
infection, developing symptoms, or succumbing to the disease, but also who is able to 
adopt recommendations to slow the spread of the disease. The homeless cannot 
shelter in place59, families in housing without running water cannot wash their hands 
frequently60, people who are detained by a state (e.g., in jails, prisons, immigrant 
detention centers, or refugee camps) may lack space to implement “physical 
distancing,” people without health insurance may delay or avoid seeking testing or 
treatment, people who rely on public transportation cannot always avoid large crowds, 
and low-wage workers are often in occupations (e.g., service, retail, cleaning, 
agricultural labor) where remote work is impossible and paid sick leave unavailable61. 
Economic disadvantage is also associated with the pre-existing conditions associated 
with higher morbidity rates once infected, such as compromised immune systems, 
diabetes, heart disease, and chronic lung diseases like asthma and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease62. We expect that, as in natural disasters, the economically 
disadvantaged will be most likely to be exposed to the hazard, susceptible to harm from 
it, and experience negative outcomes from it63,64. 
Issues of economic disadvantage intersect with issues of race and ethnicity. 
Members of minority communities (such as blacks, Latinos, and American 
Indians/Alaska Natives in the U.S.) are disproportionately found among the homeless59, 
the detained, the workers in high public contact but low-benefit occupations65, and those 
with prior health conditions that make them more vulnerable66,67. Because social 
networks tend to be racially differentiated68, members of minority communities who 
contract the disease may become vectors of transmission to others in their racial and 
ethnic communities69.  
Economic position and racial inequality are also associated with levels of trust in 
social institutions, including the healthcare system. Racial and ethnic minority 
communities, in particular, have both historical and contemporary experiences of 
discrimination, leading to distrust70–74. Members of these communities may be more 
likely to be wary about the public health information they receive, less willing to adopt 
recommended safety measures, and potentially more susceptible to “fake news.” This 
suggests the need for more targeted public health information, and for partnerships 
between public health authorities and trusted organizations that are internal to these 
communities.  
Culture 
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A sense of the self as independent versus interdependent with others is a 
dimension of cultural variation75. Western European and North American cultures that 
endorse individualism76 are considered independent, whereas most other cultures share 
a stronger commitment to collectives such as country, tribe, and family, and are 
considered interdependent77,78. While medical policies are different across societies, 
some differences in the response to the pandemic may be better described as cultural, 
and many of those have a linkage to the dimension of independence versus 
interdependence. First, the priority given to obligations and duties in Asian societies 
may motivate individuals to remain committed to social norms while suppressing 
personal desires79. Second, Asians may more readily recognize unobservable 
situational influences on viral infection, like herd immunity80. Third, social norms and 
conventions in North America and much of Western Europe tend to positively value the 
expressivity of the self (e.g., kissing, hugging, direct argumentation), relative to Asia81. 
This is another reason why interpersonal transmission of the virus could be more likely 
in independent cultures than in interdependent cultures. 
Another, related dimension of cultural variance is a society’s “tightness” versus 
“looseness.” Research has found that “tight” cultures, such as Singapore, Japan, and 
China, have strict social norms and punishments for deviance, while “loose” cultures, 
such as the U.S., Italy, and Brazil, have weaker social norms and are more 
permissive82,83. Tight nations often have extensive historical and ecological threats, 
including greater historical prevalence of natural disasters, invasions, population 
density, and pathogen outbreaks82,84. From an evolutionary perspective, when groups 
experience collective threats, strict rules may help them to coordinate to survive82,85. 
Therefore, the spread of COVID-19 infections may tighten communities. Cultures 
accustomed to prioritizing freedom over security may also have more difficulty 
coordinating in the face of a pandemic. It may also be relevant that communities 
negotiate social norms so that there is a balance between freedom and constraint, or 
tight-loose ambidexterity86. Tight rules regarding social distancing are critical, yet 
looseness within these constraints may also help to spawn the development of creative 
technical solutions that are needed to contain the pandemic as well as creating novel 
tools to help people feel connected. The cumulative evidence here suggests that very 
different strategies might be called for in varying cultural contexts in the fight against 
COVID-19. 
Political Polarization  
One cultural barrier for coordinated action within countries is political polarization. 
Polarization among citizens comes in two varieties. “Attitudinal polarization” concerns 
partisans taking extreme opposing issue positions, whereas “affective polarization” 
refers to partisans disliking and distrusting those from the opposing party(ies)87,88. 
Affective polarization has political consequences – such as a lowering trust89, privileging 
partisan labels over policy information90, and believing false information91, that can 
undermine social and economic relationships88 and impair public health.  
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One issue with polarization during a pandemic is that it might lead different 
segments of the population to arrive at different conclusions about the threat in the 
situation and appropriate actions. Partisans may receive different news because 
individuals can self-select into partisan “echo chambers”92,93 or communicate in ways 
that create echo chambers94. But in-person political interactions can provide more 
opportunity for cross-partisan communication95 (that produce a shared 
understanding96). The decrease in in-person contact due to COVID-19 may reduce 
cross-partisan interactions and information sharing.  
Yet, there are actionable steps that could reduce polarization. First, the pandemic 
highlights not only a common identity with individuals all facing the same risk, but also 
could foster a sense of shared fate. By highlighting an overarching identity, politicians, 
the media, and opinion leaders could help reduce political division around the issue. 
Second, a growing body of work shows that misperceptions of the other side underlie 
polarization97,98. Therefore, it is likely important to combat misinformation that could 
generate partisan motivated reasoning and inaccurate beliefs (see Fake News & 
Misinformation). Finally, leaders can highlight bipartisan support for COVID-related 
measures, when they exist, as such endorsements in other contexts have reduced 
polarization and led to less biased reasoning99. 
 
Science communication 
The information environment around a pandemic underscores the importance of 
effective science communication. The COVID-19 pandemic has already seen a rise in 
conspiracy theories, fake news, and misinformation100. In this context, it is hard for the 
public to distinguish scientific evidence and facts from less reliable sources of 
information. In this section, we discuss the challenges associated with different forms of 
misinformation during a pandemic, as well as strategies for engaging in effective 
science communication and persuasion around public health. 
Conspiracy theories 
Conspiracy theories emerged shortly after the first news of COVID-19 and have 
continued to persist100. Some concerned the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, for 
example, that it was a bioweapon created by the Chinese to wage war on the US, or 
vice versa101. Others focused on prevention and cure, for instance, that conventional 
medical treatment should not be trusted and that people should use alternative 
remedies to ward off the virus102. It is not surprising that conspiracy theories have 
flourished at this time. Research suggests that people feel the need to explain large 
events with proportionally large causes103, are more likely to believe in conspiracy 
theories about events with serious consequences104, and in times of crisis105. This is 
likely because people are more drawn to conspiracy theories when important 
psychological needs are frustrated106. Thus, conspiracy theories may gain more traction 
as COVID-19 spreads and more people isolate themselves107. 
These conspiracy theories can have harmful consequences. For example, belief 
in conspiracy theories has been linked to vaccine hesitancy108, climate denial109, 
extremist political views110 and prejudice111,112. COVID-19 conspiracy theories may be 
similarly problematic. For instance, people who believe that alternative remedies can 
help them fight off the virus may be less likely to follow health officials’ advice and 
instead opt for less effective (at best) or lethal (at worst) alternatives. Conspiracy beliefs 
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may also fuel hostility toward groups seen as responsible for the virus113. Some 
evidence suggests that giving people factual information prior to exposure to conspiracy 
theories can reduce conspiracy theory beliefs114, and this strategy might work in efforts 
to combat conspiracy theories relevant to the current pandemic (see following section 
for similar findings). However, because some people tend to consume information within 
like-minded “echo chambers,” combating conspiracy theories remains a challenge115. 
Fake News & Misinformation.  
Fake news and misinformation about COVID-19 has proliferated widely on social 
media with potentially dangerous consequences116. Emerging research is using social-
science to understand and counter the spread of fake news117–119. One approach is to 
debunk using fact-checking and correction120–122. Source expertise, co-partisanship, 
exposing denial, and corrections that provide causal explanations all tend to increase 
the effectiveness of countering misinformation123–125. However, fact-checking may not 
keep up with the vast amount of false information produced in times of crisis like a 
pandemic. Moreover, there is mixed research regarding whether corrections may 
actually increase belief in the original misinformation122,125–127 or in other misleading 
claims that fail to get corrected128. Thus, other approaches beyond debunking are 
needed. 
 One “prebunking” approach involves psychological inoculation129,130. Inoculation 
follows the biomedical analogy: people are exposed to a severely weakened dose of a 
persuasive argument, strong enough to trigger the immune system but not so strong as 
to overwhelm it. Meta-analysis has found inoculation effective in protecting attitudes 
from persuasion131. The fake news game, Bad News, is a real-world inoculation 
intervention (www.getbadnews.com) used by schools and governments which finds that 
preemptively exposing people to small doses of misinformation techniques (including 
scenarios about COVID-19) can reduce susceptibility to fake news132,133 and could be 
embedded directly on social media platforms134.    
Another preventative approach involves subtle prompts that nudge people to 
consider accuracy. Evidence suggests that deliberation is associated with135–137 and 
causes138 reduced belief in false news headlines that circulated on social media. 
Platforms could nudge users to think about accuracy, for example, periodically asking 
users to rate the accuracy of randomly selected posts. The crowdsourced accuracy 
ratings generated by this process may also be useful for identifying misinformation, as 
has been found for crowd ratings of source trustworthiness139–141. To effectively counter 
fake news about COVID-19 around the world, governments and social media 
companies must rigorously develop and test interventions. This includes identifying 
treatments that effectively reduce belief in misinformation, while not undermining belief 
in accurate information142. 
Persuasion 
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In the domain of science communication, scholars have explored a host of 
messaging approaches including providing information in evidence-based ways that 
increase understanding and action143. Decades of research has found that whether 
recipients are motivated to think carefully or not144, sources perceived as credible are 
more persuasive145. The credibility of sources stems from how trustworthy and expert 
they are perceived to be146. Enlisting trusted voices has been shown to make public 
health messages more effective in changing behaviour during epidemics. During the 
West African Ebola crisis, for example, religious leaders across faiths in Sierra Leone 
advocated for practices such as handwashing and safe burials. The engagement of the 
faith-based sector was considered a turning point in the epidemic response147. 
Therefore, finding credible sources for different audiences who are able to share public 
health messages might prove effective. 
Once a credible source is identified, what message should be delivered? 
Several messaging approaches may be effective, including emphasizing the benefits to 
the recipient148, focusing on protecting others (e.g., “wash your hands to protect your 
parents and grandparents”149), aligning with the recipient’s moral values150, appealing to 
social consensus or scientific norms151–153, and/or highlighting social group 
approval154,155. Which of these messages work best depends on the audience’s 
motivations156. Beyond finding effective messages for attitude change is the issue of 
inducing behavioral change. This occurs when people feel confident about their 
attitudes157. Methods to increase certainty include helping people feel knowledgeable 
about their new attitude158 and making them feel that their new attitude is the “moral” 
one to have159. It may therefore be useful to identify which messages work best on 
which populations not only to generate policy support but also to ensure individuals 
actions needed to combat the spread of the virus. 
 
Aligning Individual and Collective Interests 
The behavior of individuals living in communities is regulated by moral norms and 
values160–164. People who do what is “right” are respected and publicly admired, while 
those who do what is “wrong” are devalued and socially excluded165. These 
mechanisms of social enforcement encourage people to embrace and internalize 
shared guidelines, making them motivated to do what is considered ‘right’ while 
avoiding behaviors that seem ‘wrong’166 and does not rely on legal agreements and 
formal sanctions167. In this section, we consider how research on morality and 
cooperation can encourage prosocial behaviors by individuals and groups. 
Zero-sum thinking 
People often default to thinking that someone else’s gain—especially someone 
from a competing group—necessitates a loss to themselves, and vice-versa168,169. Zero-
sum thinking sits uneasily with the non-zero-sum nature of pandemic infection, where 
someone else’s infection is a threat to oneself and everyone else170. Zero-sum thinking 
means that while it might be psychologically compelling to hoard protective materials 
(sanitizer, masks, even vaccines) beyond what is necessary, doing so could be self-
defeating. Given the importance of slowing infections, it may be helpful to make people 
aware that others’ access to preventative measures is a benefit to oneself. 
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  Whereas reducing infections across the population is non-zero-sum, the 
provision of scarce health care resources to the infected does have zero-sum elements. 
For example, when the number of patients needing ventilators exceeds capacity, health 
care providers are often forced to make life-for-life tradeoffs. How well the policies 
enacted match the local norms can help determine how much support they receive. 
While some people are willing to sacrifice the elderly to save the young171, there are 
cultural differences on this preference172. Who is perceived to be making those 
decisions may also impact the public’s and patients’ trust. In experiments, people who 
make utilitarian judgments about matters of life and death are less trusted173. 
American’s trust in medical doctors remains high174, and compared to public health 
officials, doctors are less utilitarian in their ethical decision-making, opting instead for 
deontic “do no harm” rules175. As such, it may be best to have decisions behind life-for-
life tradeoffs perceived as systematic and coming from governmental agencies rather 
than from physicians themselves. 
Moral decision-making 
Moral decision-making during a pandemic involves uncertainty. It’s not certain 
whether social interactions will infect others. People may be less willing to make 
sacrifices for others when the benefits are uncertain176,177. For instance, in hypothetical 
scenarios about deciding whether to go to work while sick, American and British 
participants reported they would be less willing to stay home when it was uncertain they 
would infect a coworker. However, when going to work risked infecting an elderly 
coworker who would suffer a serious illness, participants reported they would be more 
willing to stay home178. Thus, focusing on worst-case scenarios, even if they are 
uncertain, may encourage people to make sacrifices for others. 
When people make moral decisions, they often consider how others would judge 
them for behaving selfishly179,180. Harmful actions are judged more harshly than harmful 
inactions181,182, and causing harm by deviating from the status quo is blamed more than 
harming by default183,184. Therefore, reframing decisions to carry on with “business as 
usual” during a pandemic as active decisions, rather than passive or default decisions, 
may make such behaviors less acceptable. 
Cooperation within groups 
Fighting a global pandemic requires large-scale cooperation. The problem is 
that, by definition, cooperation requires people to bear an individual cost to benefit other 
people185. In particular, there is a conflict between short-term self-interest versus longer-
term collective interest186. Moreover, in this pandemic, there are several collectives 
(e.g., family, community, national and international) which can make decisions to 
cooperate challenging. From an evolutionary perspective, extending self-interest to 
protect and promote the welfare of family members should be a small step, as it 
increases genetic fitness. Indeed, laboratory research has found that people prioritize 
local over global (or international) interests187,188. One major question, then, is how to 
promote cooperation? 
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Several techniques, such as sanctioning defectors189 or rewarding 
cooperators190, tend to increase cooperative behavior in laboratory experiments using 
economic games. Providing cues that make the morality of an action salient (such as 
having people read the Golden Rule before making a decision, or asking them to report 
what they think is the morally right thing to do) have also been shown to increase 
cooperation191,192. People are also more likely to cooperate when they believe that 
others are cooperating193. Accordingly, interventions based on observability and 
descriptive norms are highly effective at increasing cooperative behavior in economic 
games as well as in the field194. This suggests that leaders and the media can promote 
cooperation by making these behaviors more observable. 
 
Leadership 
Crises like the COVID-19 pandemic create an opportunity for leadership across 
groups of varying levels: families, workplaces, local communities, and nations. 
Leadership can coordinate individuals and help them avoid behaviors that are no longer 
considered socially responsible. In this section, we discuss the role of trust and 
compliance with leaders, effective identity leadership, and supporting group members 
Trust and compliance 
During a pandemic, health officials often need to persuade the population to 
make a number of behaviour changes and follow health policies aimed at 
containment—e.g., honoring a quarantine or reporting voluntarily for medical testing. By 
their nature and the scope of the population, such measures can be difficult to enforce.   
Research from the West Africa Ebola crisis of 2014-2015 suggests that enlisting local 
voices to help build engagement and trust in health officials can increase the success of 
such public health measures. For instance, specialized Ebola treatment facilities which 
employed community liaisons and social mobilizers to raise awareness and resolve 
misconceptions, were associated with increases in reporting Ebola cases195. 
Correlational evidence from Liberia also suggests that explicit government efforts to 
reach out to the population, like door-to-door canvassing, are associated with 
compliance with crisis management policies like bans on gatherings196.  
Trust in institutions and governments also may play an important role. For 
example, trust in the Liberian government was correlated with decisions to abide by 
mandated social distancing policies197 and utilizing clinics for care during the Ebola 
outbreak198. Trust was also related to decisions to adopt preventive measures such as 
Ebola vaccinations in the DRC199.  Conversely, a lack of trust in public health officials 
may lead to negative effects on utilization of health services200,201. Reliable information 
and public health messages are needed from national leaders and central health 
officials. But local voices can amplify these messages and help build the trust that is 
needed to spur behavioral change.  
Identity Leadership 
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Experimental studies clarify what leaders can do to promote trust leading to 
cooperation. A priority for leaders is to create a sense of shared social identity amongst 
their followers202. A large body of research suggests that people tend to prefer leaders 
who cultivate a sense that “we are all in this together”203. In part, such leadership gives 
people a sense of collective self-efficacy and hope204. More importantly, though, it 
provides a psychological platform for group members to coordinate efforts to tackle 
stressors205. Without leadership, there is a risk that people will avoid acts of citizenship 
and instead embrace a philosophy of “everyone for themselves.”  
Leaders who are seen as prototypical of the group (“one of us”) and as acting for 
the interest of the group as a whole (“working for us”), rather than for themselves or for 
another group, tend to gain greater influence206,207. Actions which divide the leader from 
followers, or which suggests that the leader is not prepared to share the burdens of 
followers, can be corrosive to their ability to shape followers’ behaviour208. For instance, 
leaders who threaten people with sanctions as a way to deter undesired behavior may 
make people feel distrusted and paradoxically reduce their willingness to do as they are 
told209. Leaders and authorities who treat people with respect, and communicate that 
they trust people to do as they are told, tend to be more successful in eliciting 
cooperation210. 
Elevating the ingroup without demeaning others 
Building a strong sense of shared social identity can help coordinate efforts to 
manage threats205 and foster in-group commitment and adherence to norms211. Leaders 
can do this, for instance, by being a source of “moral elevation.” Visibly displaying 
prosocial and selfless acts can prompt observers to also act with kindness and 
generosity themselves212. In this way, leaders can function as role models and motivate 
people to put their own values into action213,214. Having respected politicians, celebrities, 
and community leaders model exemplary behavior and sacrifice could help promote 
prosocial behavior and cooperation. 
Excessive efforts to foster a sense of national unity by promoting the image of 
the nation as handling the situation exceptionally well can backfire—especially if there is 
no objective basis for this. An inflated belief in national greatness (i.e., “collective 
narcissism”215) can be maladaptive in a number of ways. For instance, it is associated 
with a greater focus on defending the image of the country, rather than on caring for its 
citizens216,217. It is also correlated with seeing out-groups as a threat and blaming them 
for in-group misfortunes218. To increase a willingness to take a pandemic seriously and 
engage with other nations to defeat it, citizens and leaders may need to accept that their 
country is at risk, just like others, and find ways to share resources and expertise across 
national boundaries. 
 
Stress and coping 
Even for households free from the virus, the pandemic is likely to function as a 
major stressor, especially in terms of chronic anxiety and economic difficulties. Such 
effects may be exacerbated by self-isolation policies that can increase social isolation 
and relationship difficulties. In this section, we consider some strategies to mitigate the 
virus-linked threats to social connection, intimate relationships, and stress. 
Social isolation and connection 
17 
 
In the absence of a vaccine, one of the most vital strategies for slowing the 
pandemic is “social distancing”. However, distancing clashes with the deep-seated 
human instinct to connect with others219. Social connection helps people regulate 
emotions, cope with stress, and remain resilient during difficult times220–223. By contrast, 
loneliness and social isolation worsen the burden of stress, and often produce 
deleterious effects on mental, cardiovascular, and immune health224,225. Older adults, 
who are at the greatest risk of severe symptoms from COVID-19, are also highly 
susceptible to isolation226. Distancing threatens to aggravate feelings of loneliness and 
could produce negative long-term health consequences. 
Scholars have identified strategies that could mitigate these outcomes. First, in 
psychological terms, loneliness is construed as the subjective state that one is not 
experiencing enough social connection, whereas isolation is an objective lack of social 
interactions227. This means one can be isolated but not lonely, or lonely in a crowd. 
Thus, the term “social distancing” might imply that one needs to cut off meaningful 
interactions. A useful alternative term might be “physical distancing,” to help highlight 
the fact that social connection is possible even when people are physically separated. 
Online interactions can also foster a sense of connection. Both receiving and 
giving support online can bolster psychological well-being228. However, we caution 
against enhanced use of passive use of social media as research suggests that it may 
not contribute to one’s sense of social connection229,230. Instead, technologies that are 
informationally rich, dyadic, and temporally synchronous appear better suited to 
generating empathy and connection231,232. Special attention should be placed on helping 
people who are less familiar with these technologies to learn how to take advantage of 
digital connections.  
Intimate Relationships 
The social effects of the pandemic also extend to the inside of our homes, where 
many people find themselves in sudden forced proximity with their immediate family. 
People subject to quarantine or self-isolation are at risk for confusion and anger (Brooks 
et al., 2020), emotional tendencies that can be explosive when multiple household 
members simultaneously endure them for weeks or months on end. Indeed, some 
studies suggest that forced proximity is a risk factor for aggression233,234 and domestic 
violence235. 
Even without forced proximity, stress, including economic stress236, is linked to 
relationship difficulties. It often changes the content of social interactions (e.g., more 
focus on unpleasant logistics, less focus on emotional connection), and undermines the 
psychological resources, like empathy and patience, that make challenging interactions 
go smoothly237. A study of the effects of Hurricane Hugo in 1989, for example, revealed 
that harder hit areas experienced a spike in the divorce rate238. The news is not all bad, 
however. The hurricane study also documented surging marriage and birth rates238.  
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Major stressors, it seems, alter the trajectories of our intimate relationships, but 
researchers are still unpacking when, why, and for whom these effects are harmful vs. 
beneficial. But one factor underlying success is for individuals to calibrate their 
expectations to the circumstances, a process that will vary from couple to couple and 
from partner to partner239. The recalibration process involves both (a) lowering broad 
expectations that the course of true love in the time of COVID-19 will run smoothly while 
also (b) sustaining high expectations in those domains where the relationship can 
deliver in these conditions.  
Healthy Mindsets 
In the face of a global pandemic, avoiding stress altogether is simply not an 
option. Fortuitously, the past twenty years of research on coping and stress suggest that 
it’s not the type or amount of stress that determines its impact. Rather, mindsets and 
situation appraisals about stress can alter its impact240,241. For instance, some research 
finds these mindsets can increase the possibility of “stress related growth”: a 
phenomenon in which stressful experiences serve to increase physiological 
toughening242–244 help reorganize our priorities, and can help lead to deeper 
relationships and a greater appreciation for life245. 
Preliminary research suggests that mindsets about stress can be changed with 
short and targeted interventions. These interventions do not focus on viewing the 
stressor (such as the virus) as less of a threat246. Instead, they invite people to 
recognize that we tend to stress about things we care deeply about and that we can 
harness the stress response for positive gain. A number of studies found that inducing 
more adaptive mindsets about stress could increase positive emotion, reduce negative 
health symptoms and boost physiological functioning under acute stress246,247. 
Research is needed to see if adopting these mindsets can help some people harness 
the stress during a pandemic for positive growth. 
 
Conclusion 
Over 100 years ago, Science magazine published a paper on lessons from the 
Spanish Flu pandemic248. The paper argued that three main factors stand in the way of 
prevention: (1) people do not appreciate the risks they run, (2) it goes against human 
nature for people to shut themselves up in rigid isolation as a means of protecting 
others, and (3) people often unconsciously act as a continuing danger to themselves 
and others. Our paper provides some insights from the past century of work on related 
issues in the social and behavioural sciences that may help public health officials 
mitigate the impact of the current pandemic. Specifically, we discussed research on 
threat perception, social context, science communication, aligning individual and 
collective interests, leadership, and stress and coping. These are a selection of relevant 
topics, but readers may also be interested in other relevant work we were unable to 
cover, including on psychological reactance249,250, collective emotions and social 
media251,252, and the impact of economic deprivation and unemployment253,254. 
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Urgent action is needed to mitigate the potentially devastating effects of COVID-
19, action that can be supported by the behavioural and social sciences. However, 
many of the implications outlined here may also be relevant to future pandemics and 
public health crises. A recent report from the World Health Organization declared 
“health communication is seen to have relevance for virtually every aspect of health and 
well-being, including disease prevention, health promotion and quality of life”. 
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BOX 1: Social scientific insights and practical implications (396/400 words) 
 
We highlight some insights from each section along with potential implications for 
public health experts, policy makers, and community leaders. 
 
Insight: The notion of “panic” is often inaccurate in crisis situations.  
Implication: A shared sense of identity or purpose can be encouraged by 
addressing the public in collective terms and by urging “us” to act for the common good. 
 
Insight: Trusted sources are more persuasive. 
 Implication: Identifying sources (e.g., religious leaders) that are credible to 
different audiences to share public health messages can be effective. 
 
Insight: People prioritize prior examples of cooperative behavior over category-
membership cues (e.g., race, nationality) when deciding who counts as “us.”  
Implication: Leaders and the media might try to promote cooperative behavior 
by emphasizing that cooperating is the right thing to do and that other people are 
already cooperating. 
 
Insight: Social norms can influence behaviour, especially when they are 
modeled by ingroup members at the center of social networks, and accompanied by 
social approval. 
Implication: Messages that provide ingroup models for norms (e.g., members of 
your community) who are well connected, accompanied by social approval, may be 
effective. 
 
Insight: Moral decision making is relevant to many elements of a pandemic. 
Implication: Messages that (1) emphasize benefits to the recipient, (2) focus on 
protecting others, (3) align with the recipient’s moral values, (4) appeal to social 
consensus or scientific norms, and/or (5) highlight the prospect of social group approval 
may be persuasive. 
 
Insight: People often default to zero-sum thinking, viewing someone else’s 
gain—especially someone from a competing group—as necessitating a loss to 
themselves. 
Implication: Given the importance of slowing infections, it may be helpful to 
make people aware that they benefit from others’ access to preventative measures. 
 
Insight: People who are exposed to a severely weakened dose of 
misinformation, strong enough to trigger the response but not so strong as to 
overwhelm it (i.e., metaphorically similar to biomedical inoculation), can protect against 
false beliefs. 
Implication: Preparing people for misinformation and ensuring they have 
accurate information and counterarguments before they encounter conspiracy theories, 
fake news, or other forms of misinformation, can help ‘inoculate’ them against false 
information. 
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Insight: Social distancing could aggravate feelings of loneliness and undermine 
mental well-being. 
Implication: Use of the term “social distancing” might imply that one needs to cut 
off meaningful interactions. A preferable term is “physical distancing,” because it allows 
for the fact that social connection is possible even when people are physically 
separated. 
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Figure 1. Infographic depicting a selection of topics from the social and behavioral 
sciences relevant during a pandemic. It includes threat perception, social context, 
science communication, individual and collective interests, leadership, and stress and 
coping. 
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